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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
"\YILL J. McGO"\VAN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMpANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
7683

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
(All :figures in parentheses are the page numbers of
the record. The parties will be referred to as they
appeared in the lower court.)
The plaintiff in this case based his right of recovery
entirely upon the Safety Appliance Act relating to
couplers, 45 U.S.C.A., Section 2. In so doing he eliminated any defense of contributory negligence on his own
part, 45 U.S.C.A., Section 53.
The appeal here is by the defendant from a judgment of $7,000.00, this being the amount to which the
verdict of the jury was remitted by the court with the
consent of the plaintiff. The original verdict was for
$13,000.00.
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STATEMENT OF F'ACTS
The Statement of Facts contained in the appellant's
brief is accurate except as to those matters which are of
the most importance in this case. Throughout the entire
brief the defendant continually seeks to draw unfavorable inferences against plaintiff from the testimony introduced. We believe that a quotation from the record
will disclose that the defendant has erroneously construed the evidence given in this case with respect tq
the following matters: (1) that the drawbar of the
moving car was out of line sufficiently far that it was
necessary to 1nove it in order to effect a coupling, and
(2) that the plaintiff in fact moved the drawbar sufficiently to permit the coupling of the cars.
The coupling mo¥ement was made on the defendant's tracks at Cameo, Colorado. The coupling was to
be made on the Cameo siding. The engine had hold of a
loaded coal car (36, 37) which had a seventy ton capacity (110). The coal car was attached to the rear end
of the engine and the movement was to the east along
this track for the purpose of effecting a coupling to a
boxcar which was stationary on the Cameo siding track.
Preparatory to making this coupling plaintiff placed
himself eight feet west of the boxcar. He then observed
the approaching engine and coai car. He was unable
to make a judgment of the position of the drawbar until
it was about eight feet from the stationary car (39).
The testimony of the plaintiff contained in the record
establishes that he did not equivocate about the position
of the drawbar. He stated (39):
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"Q. Now did you 1nake any observation of
the coupling mechanisn1 on that 1noving car which
required you to take smne action~
··A. Not until it got close enough to me. I
could see it was out of line."
Plaintiff definitely testified that in his opiniOn the
drawbar \Yas so far out of line that it would not couple.
He based this opinion upon his eight years of experience
in participating in coupling operations. His testimony
on this subject was as follows (40):

"Q. As that was coming along there did
you form an opinion as to whether or not, with
the drawbar on that car in the position it was,
whether or not there would be a coupling~
'·A. Yes, I did.
'·Q. vVill you tell us your opinion, please~
"A. Well, it got up to where it was about
eight feet from me. I could see the drawbar was
far enough out of line that it wouldn't couple and
that is when I started shoving it."
Plaintiff put his foot on the drawbar and attempted
to kick it over but even then it had not moved far enough
to effect the coupling. He testified "I could see it still
wasn't going to couple up so I shoved on it again" (40).
On cross-examination plaintiff testified in regard to the
drawbar as follows ( 63, 64) :

"Q. Now when you say that drawbar was
laterally out of position, in what way was it out
of position-to the north or to the south~
"A. It was over too far this way-toward
me.
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"Q. Which would be toward the north 1
"A. Had it not been I wouldn't have been
shoving it over in order that it would couple on
impact."
He further testified on cross-examination ( 71) :

"Q. Now how far would you say, Mr. McGowan, the drawbar was off laterally to the north
when you first saw it1
"A. Well, it was far enough out of line it
wouldn't have coupled on impact. If it had've
I wouldn't have pushed on it with my foot.
"Q. Can you tell me how far, in inches, or
feet it was in direction off to your direction?
"A. In inches I couldn't tell you. All I know
is it was out of line."
Plaintiff's testimony, as aforesaid, is unequivocal
upon the proposition that the drawbar on the moving
coal car was out of line to the north, or toward plaintiff,
to such an extent that it would not have coupled without
adjustment. Plaintiff was an experienced brakeman and
was on the ground for the purpose of effecting the
coupling of these two cars. The jury was entitled to
give weight to his judgment on the position of the drawbar. Defendant's continual referring to this testimony
as guesswork is neither fair nor does it reflect the fact
nor does it give plaintiff the full benefit of this testimony.
Throughout its brief defendant continually states
that it could not be ascertained from the evidence
whether or not plaintiff moved the drawbar by shoving
against it with his foot. Plaintiff unequivocally testified
on a number of occasions that there was movement
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of the drawbar on each occasion that he shoved against
it. He shoved three times with his right foot. On this
subject piaintiff testified (41) :

"Q. And did the drawbar or did the cars
couple together~
"A. They did.
"Q. And did you move the drawbar in order
that they could~
"A. I did."
On cross-exrunination he was asked in detail concerning the movement of the drawbar accomplished by
his pushing. He testified ( 66) :

"Q. * * * Is it your opinion that it moved
or didn't move on this first occasion~
"A. Well, I would say it moved a little."
He then testified :
·
"Q. Well, when you found out it had only
moved a little, then what did you do~
"A. Well, it continued on, the cars continued
on into the impact and I saw it wasn't in line, it
wasn't going to make it, so I kept putting my
foot in there shoving on it. I think I shoved twice
more on it."
Concerning the second push or shove he testified
(70):

"Q. And on the second occasion when you
pushed on it with your right foot, which was
after you had given the stop signal which you
say was ignored on that occasion, did the drawbar move with the pressure of your foot~
"A. It did.
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"Q. And how far did it move on that second
occasion when you pushed~
"A. Welt, I couldn't say approximately how
far it moved, but I know it moved. Had it not
moved the couplers wouldn't have coupled on the
impact and have my foot in there.
"Q. Just answer my question. On the second
occasion you say when you pushed the drawbar
did lllOVe~
"A. Yes."
Regarding the third shove he testified ( 71) :

"Q. Well now did the drawbar move over
with the pressure of your foot on the third occasion~

"A.

It did, or it wouldn't have coupled up."

He then was asked concerning all three pushes or
shoves as follows (71):

"Q. So on each occasion when you pushed
on the drawbar with your foot the drawbar
yielded and moved to some degree toward the
center¥
"A. That's right."
We submit that the foregoing testimony regarding
the movement of the drawbar establishes that it was
moved by the plaintiff sufficiently so that a coupling
could be effected.
Counsel in this F .E.L.A. case theorizes that as
matter of fact that p'laintiff was in some way attempting
to adjust the knuckles with his foot and not to align
the drawbar (appellant's brief, page 13). This is absolutely contrary to testimony of the plaintiff when he
testified ( 73) :
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"Q. And in this case there was no need to
correct that situation as far as the knuckles were
concerned~

•· A.

As far as the knuckles were concerned,

no."
STATE:\IENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A
FINDING THAT THE COUPLERS DID NOT MEET THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT
RELATING TO COUPLERS.

POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR, EITHER PREJUDICIAL OR OTHERWISE, IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY
AS SET FORTH IN INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 3 AND 4.

POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR, PREJUDICIAL
OR OTHERWISE, IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS SET
FORTH IN INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 5 AND 7.

POINT IY.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR, PREJUDICIAL
OR OTHERWISE, IN EXCLUDING THE PROFFERED EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT THAT PLAINTIFF VIOLATED SAFETY RULES OF THE DEFENDANT COMPANY
EITHER ON THE OCCASION HERE INVOLVED OR PREVIOUSLY.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A
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FINDING THAT THE COUPLERS DID NOT MEET THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT
RELATING TO COUPLERS.

We are unable to understand the contention of
defendant under its Point I. The purport of the point
as stated in its brief would lead one to believe that
its contention is that a directed verdict in favor of the
defendant should have been granted. However, in its
brief on page 7 the defendant states that it does not
contend that the trial court erred in refusing to grant
the defendant's motion for a directed verdict because
of the absence of a mechanical defect in the couplers
or because of a failure of proof of negligence on the
part of the defendant in maintaining the coupiers in a
good state of repair. If no such contention is made,
then a directed verdict would not have been in order
and the sufficiency of the evidence would become established by admission of the defendant.
Defendant does contend, however, that there is no
evidence tending to prove that the cars involved were
not equipped with couplers that would couple automatically on impact or that there was any necessity for
plaintiff to go between the cars in order to effect the
coupling on this occasion. Plaintiff's contention in the
trial of this case was that the drawbar of the moving
coal car was so far out of line that it was necessary
for an adjustment to be made in order to effect the
coupling and there was no device or attachment whereby
the plaintiff could make the necessary adjustment without going between the ends of the cars. Defendant's
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own witness, Thomas McCoy, established that there was
no attachment or device which could be used to accomplish a lateral adjustment of the drawbar and that it
would be necessary for a brakeman to put some part of
his body between the cars in order to accomplish the
adjustment (110, 111) :

"Q. Now there is nothing, if that coupler and
the drawbar get off center, there is no mechanism
there that you could stand outside from between
the cars and adjust the drawbar, is there~
"A. No sir.

* * * *
"Q. And he would have to step in between
the cars, wouldn't he~ Isn't that right~
:11:

* * * * *
"A. He would have to get a part of his body
in there.
"Q. In order to make that adjustment to that
drawbar~
"A. Yes sir."
It was also conceded by this witness that these drawbars because of wear and rust and other factors come
out of line and remain out of line so that they cannot
be coupled without some adjustment (111, 112):

"Q. Now these various coupler mechanisms
because of various differences in wear, a different amount of rust, and other things of that kind,
they vary, do they not in connection with the
movement of the rocker, or the movement of the
coup'ler drawbar itself?
"A. Yes, they could.
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"Q. And the ease with which they may be
moved differs as among couplers 1
"A. Yes sir.
"Q. Some are hard to move and some are
easier1
"A. Yes sir.
"Q. And some will stay over farther than an
inch, will they not1
"A. Some will, yes.
"Q. And it depends upon the wear and the
amount of rust or dirt that is in these working
parts1
"A. And the type of carrier arm would have
a lot to do with it.
"Q. And the type of carrier arm 1
"A. Yes.
"Q. And it isn't your testimony that these
drawbars can't get far enough out of line so they
won't couple 1
"A. Well, I don't know about that. I saw
them when they were coupled and we uncoupled
them and coupled them back together and they
coupled.
"Q. W eU, you have seen cars that wouldn't
couple when the drawbar was out of line, haven't
you1
"A. Yes sir.
"Q. And that happens frequently1
"A. Well, I wouldn't say with what frequency.
"Q. But you have seen it a number of times,
isn't that right 1
"A. Yes sir."
One of the first cases construing the Safety Appliance Act relating to couplers specifically held that Act
placed an absolute duty upon the carrier to furnish cars
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with coupling devices which could be coupled together
without the necessity of n1en going between the cars for
the purpose of coupling. That case was Johnson v.
Southern Pacific Company, 196 U.S. 1, 25 S. Ct. 158, 162,
the court there stated:
"Tested by these principles, we think the view
of the circuit court of appeals, which limits the
2d section to merely providing automatic couplers,
does not give due effect to the words 'coupling
automatically by irnpact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between the cars,' and cannot be sustained.
'"\Ye dismiss, as without merit, the suggestion
which has been made, that the words 'without the
necessity of men going between the ends of the
cars,' which are the test of compliance with section 2, apply only to the act of uncoupling. The
phrase literally covers both coupling and uncoupling; and if read, as it should be, with a
comma after the word 'uncoupled,' this becomes
entirely clear. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v.
Voelker, 129 Fed. 522; United States v. Lacher,
13± U.S. 624, 33 L. ed. 1080, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625."
The court also expressed the underlying reason for
the passage of the Safety Appliance Act as follows, page
161:
"Nevertheless, the circuit court of appeals
was of opinion that it would be an unwarrantable
extension of the terms of the law to hold that
where the couplers would couple automatically
with couplers of their own kind, the couplers
must so couple with couplers of different kinds.
But we think that what the act plainly forbade
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was the use of cars which could not be coupled
together automatically by impact, by means of
the couplers actually used on the cars to be
coupled. The object was to protect the lives and
limbs of railroad employees by rendering it unnecessary for a man operating the couplers to go
between the ends of the cars ; and that object
would be defeated, not necessarily by the use of
automatic couplers of different kinds, but if those
different kinds would not automatically couple
with each other. The point was that the railroad
companies should be compelled, respectively, to
adopt devices, whatever they were, which would
act so far uniformly as to eliminate the danger
consequent on men going between the cars."
In recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States it has been held that the act is violated
where the couplers do not or will not couple on impact
without the necessity of men going between the cars.
In O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 338 U.S. 384, 70
S. Ct. 200, 206, the Supreme Court related the historic
deve'lopment of the law under the Safety Appliance Act
and pointed out that courts did not readily accept the
simple proposition contained in the Act. The court held
the Act places an absolute duty upon the carrier to furnish a coupler which will, under all conditions, automatically couple by impact without the necessity of men
going between the cars. Any time the coupler fails to
so operate a violation of the Act has occurred and this
regardless of any contention that too much was demanded
of the coupler mechanism or by showing that the coupler
had been properly manufactured, diligently inspected
and showed no visible defects. The court stated:
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"* • • These circumstances do go to the question of negligence; but, even if a railroad should
explain away its negligence, that is not enough to
explain away its liability if it has violated the
Act."
The court in this case was discussing instructions
and the final statement of the court adequately expresses
its holding:

"* * * As to the clai1n based on the Safety
Appliance Act, we hold that the plaintiff was entitled to a peremptory instruction that to ·equip
a car with a coupler which broke in the switching
operation was a violation of the Act, which rendered defendant liable for injuries proximately
resulting therefrom, and that neither evidence -of
negligence nor of diligence and care was to be
considered on the question of this liability."
One of the earlier Supreme Court cases is analogous
to the present case. In San Antonio & Aransas Pass
Railway Company v. Wagner, 241 U.S. 476, 36 S. Ct. 626,
627, 60 L. Ed. 1110, a judgment in favor of plaintiff
in an F.E.L.A. case was affirmed. The evidence tended
to show that plaintiff was engaged in switching in defendant's yard and was riding upon the footboard at
the rear of an engine in order to make a coupling between it and a boxcar. The engine was backing. At the
first impact the coupling did not make. Plaintiff then
signaled the engineer to move forward and then gave
him a backup signal. The plaintiff mounted the footboard of the engine. He looked down and saw that the
drawhead on the engine had shifted over to the side.
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He reached up with his left foot to shift the drawhead
over so it would couple. His right foot slipped on the
wet footboard and his left foot was caught between the
drawheads and crushed. The trial court instructed the
jury that if the locomotive and car in question were
not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact without the necessity of plaintiff going between the
ends of the cars and by reason of this and as a proximate
result of it plaintiff received his injuries, the verdict
should be in his favor. The contentions made by the defendant there are almost identical with those made by
the defendant here. The court expressed them as follows:

"* * * They set up that defendant was a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce, and
invoked the provisions of the F·ederal safety appliance act * * *, averring that all couplers attached to railroad engines, tenders, or cars must
have sufficient lateral motion to permit trains to
round the curves, and must be provided with adjustable knuckles which can be opened and closed,
and such couplers must be adjusted at times in
order that they may couple automatically by impact, and that there is no kind of automatic
coupler constructed or that can be constructed
which will couple automatically at all times without previous adjustment, because of the lateral
play necessary to enable coupled cars to round
curves; that the engine and car upon which plaintiff was employed at the time of his injury were
engaged in interstate commerce, and were equipped with automatic couplers which would couple
automatically by impact as required by the acts
of Congress, but an adjustment was necessary for
this purpose, and could have been made by the
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plaintiff going between the cars while they were
standing, but without going between the ends of
the cars while in n1otion, or between a Inoving engine and cars, and without kicking the coupling
or in any manner endangering his own personal
safety; with n1ore to the same effect."
The court in ruling for plaintiff stated in part as
follows:
"It is insisted that neither the original act
nor the amendment precludes adjushnent of the
coupler prior to or at the time of impact, or
treats a drawbar out of alignment as a defect in
the automatic coupler, or as evidence that the cars
are not equipped with couplers measuring up to
the statutory standard. The evidence of bad repair in the automatic equipment was not confined
to the fact that the drawbar on the engine was
out of line; the fact that the coupling pin on the
box car failed to drop as it should have done at
the first impact, and required manipulation in
preparation for the second impact, together with
the fact that the drawbar on the engine was so
far out of line as to require adjustment in preparation for the second impact, and the opinion
evidence, being sufficient to sustain a finding that
the equipment was defective. The jury could
reasonably find that the misalignment of the
drawbar was greater than required to permit the
rmtnding of cttrves, or, if not, that an adjusting
lever should have been provided upon the engine
as upon the car, and that there was none upon
the engine."
In Chicago, St. P., M. and 0. Ry. Co. v. Muldowney,
130 F·. 2d 971, 975 (cert. den. 317 U.S. 700), a situation
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was presented in which plaintiff's decedent apparently
attempted to adjust a drawbar which was out of line.
There were no eyewitnesses to the occurrence of the decedent being caught between the couplers. In the switching operation involved a locomotive tender was to be
coupled to a standing car. Decedent was standing on
one of the steps on the rear of the tender. When the
engine had reached a point about three car lengths from
the standing car the engine power was shut off and it
drifted gradually toward this car. A yardmaster standing near by, thinking it was about time for the engineer
to slack ahead, turned around and observed decedent's
lantern laying between the cars in the middle of the
track. Decedent was between the coupler of the locoInotive and the coupler of the standing car. The engine
was moved ahead. Decedent was extricated and taken to
the hospital where he died without recovering consciousness. After his removal the crew attempted to proceed
with the switching operation. The engine backed up to
contact the coupler on the standing car but the coupling
did not make. The drawbars on the switch engine and
the standing car were out of alignment to such an extent
that a coupling could not be made without an adjustment of the drawbars. After the adjustment was made
the cars coupled automatically. The court pointed out
that it was the duty of decedent to see that the cars were
properly coupled and if there was an adjustment to be
made in the drawbars it was his duty to make it. An expert testified that the presence of a man's body between
the two drawbars could not have forced them out of line.
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The court held that by virtue of this testimony the jury
could have found that the coupling would not have made
because of the drawbars being out of line and that decedent was performing his duties in attempting to make
the adjustment at the time of his injury. The court in
discussing the testimony stated as follows:

"* * * It must be borne in mind that Muldowney at the time of the accident was enga:ged
in an atten1pt to make this coupling. He was not,
as suggested, proceeding to cross the track between the engine and the Swift car for the purpose of going to the yard house. There is no evidence that that was his purpose and to have done
so would have been a desertion of his post in the
midst of an important movement in which he was
performing an essential part. His activities, we
have a right to assume, centered around the successful completion of his undertaking. If the
drawbars were out of alignment to the extent that
the coupling could not be made automatically on
impact, that condition could only be cured by adjusting in some way these drawbars and that
involved some movement of them. This could not
be effected by the hand lever, and if the condition existed it was the duty of Muldowney not only
to detect it but to remedy it. Assuming for the
moment that this condition existed, the jury might
well have concluded not only that he observed
the condition but that he was in the act of attempting to remedy it. In doing so it was necessary for
him to pass between the ends of the cars. If the
assumed condition existed, the only. good faith
effort he could have made to couple necessitated
an adjustment of the drawbar. Any attempt to
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1nake the coupling without such adjustment would
be futile."
In the Muldowney case it was necessary for the
plaintiff to rely upon testimony that after the attempted
coupling was made the drawbars were out of alignment
to such an extent that a coupling could not be effected.
In the case at bar the plaintiff was in a position where
he could see and observe the position of the couplers and
testified that the drawbar was sufficiently out of line on
the coal car that a coupling could not be effected without
adjustment of the drawbar. The position of plaintiff
and the decedent in the Muldowney case were the same
in that both were attempting to make an adjustment of
the drawbar in order to effect a coupling. Plaintiff definitely testified in the case at bar that the drawbar was
out of line and was moved sufficiently to permit the
coupling to take place. We submit that this case is authority for the proposition that where drawbars are out
of alignment and it is necessary for the brakemen or
switchmen to go between the cars to make the adjustment
a violation of the Act has occurred and if it results in
injury, the railroad company is liable under the Safety
Appliance Act. Neither the Act nor the authorities require that an actual failure to couple is necessary to
establish a violation.
Defendant asserts there is no evidence that the
rocker device failed to perform its function. Under the
evidence this rocker device was supposed to cause the
drawbar to come back into line so that the cars would
couple on impact. The drawbar in this case was not in
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such a position and hence the deviee had not functioned
as it should. Concededly this could happen and adjustment between the cars would then be necessary.
In Atlantic City R. Co. v. Parker, 242 U.S. 56, 37
S. Ct. 69, 61 L. Ed. 150, the drawbar was out of line and
plaintiff put his arm between the cars to adjust. In
holding for plaintiff the court stated:
"If couplers failed to couple automatically
upon a straight track, it at least may be said that
a jury would be warranted in finding that a
lateral play so great as to prevent coupling was
not needed, and that, in the absence of any explanation believed by them, the failure indicated
that the railroad had not fully complied with the
law-.''

/

;t.•

..

The fact that the coupler functioned properly on
other occasions is immaterial. Carter v. Atlanta & St.
Andreu·s Bay Ry. Co., 338 U.S. 430, 70 S. Ct. 226.
The case of Kansas City M. & 0. R. R. Co. v. Wood,
262 S.\V. 520, cited by defendant, was decided in 1924
and the consideration of evidence is not in accord \vith
the modern day authorities on the interpretation of the
F.E.L.A. and Safety Appliance Acts. That case is distinguishable on the facts because the plaintiff there only
observed the coupler at the instance of impact and testified that on the impact "it took the drawbar away from
my foot." The court characterized this by saying that
it strongly indicated that plaintiff had not pushed the
drawbar over prior to the time of impact. In the case
at bar the testimony is definite that the drawbar was

:·
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moved by plaintiff. The defendant takes the position
that the testimony of plaintiff must be entirely disregarded in this case. Under well-known principles in
cases arising under the F.E.L.A., courts are not permitted to disregard testimony. The factual questions
must be submitted to a jury, which is the tribunal chosen
by Congress to decide these questions of fact. See
Lavender v. K urn, 327 U.S. 645, 66 S. Ct. 740, 90 L. Ed.
196; Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. R. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 64 S.
Ct. 409, 88 L. Ed. 520; Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S.
53, 69 S. Ct. 413, 93 L. Ed. 497.
From the language of this Wood case the court
apparently takes the view that it is necessary to show
some "defect" but this is not the law. Carter v. Atlanta
& St. Andrews Bay Ry. Co., 338 U.S. 430, 70 S. Ct. 226.
We submit that the evidence in this case supports a
verdict in favor of plaintiff under the law set forth in
Instruction No. 3 and which correctly states the law of
this case.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR, EITHER PREJUDICIAL OR OTHERWISE, IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY
AS SET FORTH IN INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 3 AND 4.

Under Point II the defendant contends that the
court's Instructions No. 3 and No. 4 are erroneous. No
proper exception was taken to these instructions. RUle 51
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part:

"* * * No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he
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objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of an
instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his
objection."
At R. 138 defendant excepted to Instruction No. 3
generally, giving no grounds for its exception, and to
the first paragraph thereof on the grounds there was
no evidence that there was any necessity for plaintiff
to go in front of the moving car to effect a coupling.
This is not the reason it now criticizes this instruction. It contends in its brief, if we understand defendant,
that defendant's liability is erroneously made to turn
upon a theoretical function and conduct of plaintiff and
that this instruction requires defendant to furnish a
coupling device that needs no manpower to manipulate.
The grounds set forth in the exception are adequately answered by the testimony of plaintiff that the
drawbar was so far out of line that it would not couple
without an adjustment, and the testimony that there was
no device or mechanism by the use of which a lateral adjustment could be made and it would be necessary for
the workmen to go between the cars to make the adjustment.
Defendant's exceptions to Instruction No. 4 are
found at R. 138 and 139. No ground of any kind is given
as a basis for the exception.
Defendant has not adequately raised the claimed
error in these instructions and this Court should not,
therefore, consider such assigned error on this appeal.
On the merits of this assignment these instructions
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correctly state the law and the language thereof cannot
be strained to mean what defendant says it means. Instruction No. 3 sets forth plaintiff's theory of the case,
and No. 4 sets forth defendant's theory. By No. 3 the
jury was told that to find for plaintiff it must be found
by a preponderance of the evidence that the cars would
not couple automatically by impact without the necessity
of plaintiff going between the cars. In No. 4 the jury
was told that if the couplers, even though out of alignn1ent, would nevertheless have coupled automatically upon impact, then plaintiff's assistance was unnecessary
and the verdict in such event should be for defendant.
These instructions follow the language of 45 U.S.C.A., Section 2, and the construction placed thereon by
the cases cited under Point 1 of this brief.
These instructions do not say that defendant must
furnish couplers which will couple without the necessity
of any manpower. They merely require that the couplers
couple automatically without the necessity of plaintiff
going between the cars. Any manpower or manipulation
exerted outside of a position between the cars is not
prohibited.
In Affolder v. New York C. & St. L. R. Co., 339 U.S.
96, 70 S. Ct. 509, 94 L. Ed. 683, cited by defendant, one car
was kicked against another and they failed to couple
together. The court held that before there could be a
finding that tlie cars had not properly coupled, a showing should be made that the couplers were placed in a
position to operate on impact. Placing them in position
would have to be accomplished without the necessity of
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going between the cars under the express language of the
coupler act. The Affolder case does not involve such
adjushnent. The case at bar does. Therein lies the distinction between the two cases.
lVestern & Atlantic R. R. v. Gentle, 58 Ga. App. 282,
198 S. E. :257, cited by defendant, is not in harmony with
the late United States Supreme Court cases. It holds
that it must be shown that failure to couple resulted
from a defect. This is not now necessary. In the case at
bar it was shown that the drawbar was out of line and
no mechanism for adjustment without going between the
cars. No such proof was present in the Gentle case.
Defendant also cites Southern Ry. Co. v. Stewart,
119 F. 2d 85, and Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Charlton,
247 Fed. 34. Both of these cases involve a situation where
coupling was not effected because the coupler knuckles
were closed. However, the cars had a lever with which
the knuckles could be opened without going between the
cars and there was no showing that this lever had been
used. The workmen went between the cars without any
necessity. In the case at bar the jury could find the drawbar out of line and no mechanism to adjust without the
necessity of going between the cars.
We submit that defendant has not properly raised
any error in these instructions by its failure to properly
object and in any event the instructions correctly set
forth the law and the basis upon which the jury could
return a verdict for plaintiff or for defendant.
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POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR, PREJUDICIAL
OR OTHERWISE, IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS SET
FORTH IN INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 5 AND 7.

Defendant has again failed to comply with Rule 51,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, by its failure to state
distinctly the matter to which it objects and the grounds
of its objection to Instructions No. 5 and No. 7. At
Record 139 it merely excepts to these instructions as a
whole and particular parts of each without disclosing
to the trial court its grounds. We submit that this
claimed error is not properly raised and should not be
considered on this appeal.
Instruction No. 5 correctly states the law and the
entire instruction must be read together. The first paragraph defines "without the necessity of going between
the cars." It means necessary for a workman to place
son1e part of his body within the area between the cars.
In that connection if it was necessary for plaintiff to
adjust the drawbar or coupling mechanism with his hands
or. feet there would be a violation of the Act. Read as
a whole the only reasonable construction is that such
use of hands or feet would have to be in the area between
the cars to constitute a violation. The second paragraph
refers to the first. We submit any other interpretation
would be unreasonable. The liability Instruction No. 3
clearly discloses the necessity of this requirement before
plaintiff can recover.
We agree that if a mechanism which worked was on
the coupler or drawbar which would adjust the lateral
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position of the drawbar without the necessity of men
going between the cars there would be no violation. But
here we have none. The rocker 1nechanism on the coupler
here involved did not prevent the coupler from being out
of line and no n1echanism was present for plaintiff to use.
He had to align the drawbar with his hands and feet between the cars. It was conceded by defendant's expert
that these rocker mechanisms sometimes, because of rust,
dirt or other reasons, did not swing back into center
position and that adjustments became necessary which
required use of hands and feet within the forbidden
area.
Defendant under this point talks of devices to open
knuckles and that the Act is satisfied if such devices
can be manipulated outside the ends of the cars. This is
true but there is no issue raised concerning knuckles or
devices of such kind. Plaintiff contended that the drawbar was out of line and there was no device he could use
outside the ends of the cars to make the adjustment. All
the evidence related to this and no one involved in the
case, jury, court or counsel, could have possibly believed
that such evidence or the instructions concerned coupler
knuckles or devices to open them.
By Instruction No. 7 the jury was told that defendant was not relieved from compliance with the Safety
Appliance Act relating to couplers by reason of the fact
that some lateral motion in the coupler mechanism was
necessary. The defendant introduced evidence about the
necessity of lateral motion in couplers in order that cars
could make curves without derailing. The instruction
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was required so that the jury would be able to properly
evaluate this testimony and understand that merely because lateral motion was necessary still it was incumbent
upon defendant to furnish couplers which could be
coupled automatically by impact without the necessity
of men going between the cars.
Defendant does not claim that this instruction as
so construed erroneously states the law. It concedes that
the necessity of lateral motion does not relieve it from
compliance with the Act. It rightly concedes that nothing
relieves it from that duty but claims it was unnecessary
to give the instruction. It was proper and applicable
in this case because of the testimony introduced by defendant on the subject of lateral motion of the drawbar.
Defendant contends that this instruction informs the
jury that lateral play is evidence of a violation. A reading of the instruction establishes the fallacy of this assertion. The instruction just does not say that.
The case, Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Corp. v. Arrington} 126 V a. 194, 101 S.E. 415, does not suppo·rt defendant here. In that case plaintiff went between an engine
and a car to adjust the knuckle and drawbar, the engine
moved into him and he was injured. The court held that
it was proper for plaintiff to testify, just as plaintiff
did in the case at bar, that it was necessary for him to
go between the cars to make the adjustment. The case
was reversed because the damages were excessive and
because the trial court refused to give defendant's request that side play in a drawbar according to standards
in general and accepted use on railroads does not con-
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stitute a defect in the coupler unless the jury believed
there was greater side play or the couplers were farther
out of line than necessary for safe operation. Regardless of whether this request was in compliance with the
Act the case does not hold that an instruction such as
Xo. 7 is erroneous. Defendant made no such request and
assigns no error here based on a refusal of any of its
requests.
\Ye submit that defendant cannot prevail on its
Point III because (1) the error, if any, was not properly
preserved for review and (2) the instructions correctly
state the law and are applicable to this case.
POINT IV.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR, PREJUDICIAL
OR OTHERWISE, IN EXCLUDING THE PROFFERED EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT THAT PLAINTIFF VIOLATED SAFETY RULES OF THE DEFENDANT COMPANY
EITHER ON THE OCCASION HERE INVOLVED OR PREVIOUSLY.

The plaintiff in this case contended that the defendant violated the Safety Appliance Act relating to
couplers in that it was necessary for him to go in between
the ends of the cars in order to effect the coupling. The
drawbar was out of line and no device or means was
furnished by defendant so that an adjustment could be
made without going between the ends of the cars.
Defendant's contention under this point of its brief
is one which if sustained would entirely eliminate this
particular portion of the Safety Appliance Act. The situation as presented is simply that the ·congress of the
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United States has said that it shall be a violation of the
statute to have couplers which would not couple without
the necessity of men going between the cars. The company promulgates a rule which is violated if the workman
goes between the ends of the cars. By thus legislating
the company can immediately discharge its statutory
duty by the creation of a rule. Then, even though the
statute is violated, under defendant's contention the rule
of the company is also violated, and it would be left to
the jury to determine which violation it thought more
ser~ous. A moment's reflection on this subject should
convince that certainly Congress did not intend any such
result as this and the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, under their cases would not tolerate such
a contention.
The rules offered in evidence by defendant are rules
prohibiting employees from going in between moving
engines or cars to couple them, using their hands or feet
to adjust drawbars and· stepping on a track between or
in front of an engine or cars before the stop is made.
A violation of these rules could be no more than contributory negligence. The going between the ends of the
cars by the plaintiff cannot be eliminated from this case
nor can the necessity for his going between the ends of
the cars in order to effect a coupling be eliminated. The
testimony, as heretofore pointed out, supports a finding
that the drawbar was out of line and there is no question
but what in order to make an adjustment it was necessary
for plaintiff to go in between the cars. We respectfully
submit that. the violation of these rules in going between
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the cars could never raise itself above the dignity of
contributory negligence, which is expressly eliminated
from consideration in these cases involving a violation
of the Safety Appliance Act.
\Y e submit that under the authorities proof of these
rules and their violation was not admissible as a defense.
The only question here involved was whether there had
been a violation of the Safety Appliance Act and whether
or not that violation contributed, in whole or in part,
to cause damages to plaintiff. The matter of causation,
if a violation exists, could not be eliminated by proof
that the railroad told its employees not to go between
the cars.
A contention very similar to that now made by defendant was made in the case of San Antonio & Aransas
Pass R. Co. v. Wagner, 241 U.S. 476, 36 S. Ct. 626, 630,
60 L. Ed. 1110. Plaintiff in that case sought to adjust
the drawbar with his foot and it was caught between the
coupler of the engine and the coupler of a car. The court
stated:
"In various forms plaintiff in error raises the
contention that it was plaintiff's improper management of the coupling operation that was the
proximate cause of his injury. But any misconduct on his part was no more than contributory
negligence, which, as already shown, is, by the
employers' liability act, excluded from consideration in a case such as this."
Plaintiff in this case sought to bring his case only
under the following provision of Section 53 of Title 45,
U.S.C.A.:
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"* * * Provided, That no such employee who
may be injured or killed shall be held to have been
guilty of contributory negligence in any case
where the violation of such common carrier of any
statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee."
By doing so plaintiff eliminated contributory negligence
from the case. That this can be done was recognized by
this Court in Ehalt v. McCarthy, 104 Utah 110, 138 P. 2d
639, 641, where it was stated:
"By planting his action on the above act,
plaintiff was not embarrassed by any defense of
contributory negligence which could have been
raised if the action had been founded on sees. 51
to 59 of 45 U.S.C.A., for the reason that the railroad is absolutely liable for injuries which are
proximately caused by a failure to comply with
the Boiler Inspection Act. Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy R. Co. v. Willard, 220 U.S. 413, 31 S.
Ct. 460, 55 L. Ed. 521, 61 L. Ed. 874; Baltimore
& Ohio Railroad Co. v. Groeger, 266 U.S. 521, 45
S. Ct. 169, 69 L. Ed. 419."
There are many cases which have held that by claiming only a violation of the Safety Appliance Act plaintiffs
have effectively eliminated proof of contributory negligence from the case.
In Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. v. Auchenbach, 16 F. 2d
550, 551, the plaintiff had withdrawn all charges of negligence against the defendant and relied entirely upon an
alleged violation of the Safety Appliance Act. The evidence disclosed that plaintiff opened the knuckle on the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

31
coupler on the rear end of a car so that it would couple
with a cut of three cars soon to be brought down from another track. The couplers came together in solid impact
but the pin of the drawhead of the approaching cars
did not drop and the coupling failed. Plaintiff signaled.
for the engineer to ease ahead and the cars moved a distance of one and one-half or two car lengths and stopped
upon a signal from plaintiff. Plaintiff then went between
the cars and attempted to manipulate the couplers by
hand. The cut of cars attached to the engine moved back
without warning and plaintiff's arm was caught between
the two couplers. During the course of the trial the defendant sought to introduce in evidence a rule which
required a person going between cars at night to leave
his lantern outside on the ground in the view of the other
members of the switching crew. Plaintiff failed to comply and defendant contended that this rule of violation
constituted the proximate and sole cause of plaintiff's injuries. It was held that the trial court was correct in
refusing to admit the rule in evidence. The court pointed
out that the plaintiff was engaged in a coupling operation and there could be no question but that he came
squarely within the class of employees to whom the law
intended to assure protection. In discussing this proposition the court stated:

"* * * The defendant, however, to put the
issue of proximate cause into the case, took the
position, and still urges, that the Safety Appliance
Act stopped and the protection it afforded the
plaintiff ended when the couplers (because of a
violation of the Act) failed to couple on the first
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impact, and that the Safety Appliance Act being
thus out of the case, the plaintiff himself was from
that moment solely responsible for what happened
as a result of his failure to observe the Company's
rule to leave his lantern on the ground before going between the cars. Clearly the Safety Appliance Act did not disappear from the case when
its violation was first observed by the failure of
the couplers to couple automatically by impact.
When the couplers failed thus to couple, there
arose the very danger against which the Act affords protection, the evil against which its provisions for safety appliances are directed. St.
Louis & San Francisco R. R. Co. v. Conarty,
supra; Chicago G. W. R. R. Co. v. Schendel, supra.
The Safety Appliance Act 'was intended to provide against the risk of coupling and uncoupling
and to obviate the necessity of men going between
the ends of the cars.' Lang v. New York Central,
R. R. Co., 255 U. S. 455, 41 S. Ct. 381, 65 L. Ed.
729. When that necessity arises with its risk of
personal injury, the intention of the Act is defeated and the law, if violated, extends to the
consequences. The plaintiff in the instant case
went between the cars to prepare for another attempt to couple only because the couplers did not
at first couple automatically by impact, that is,
'Because the equipment of the car which it ·was
necessary to (couple) did not meet the statutory
requirements especially intended to protect him in
his position.' Chicago G. W. R. R. Co. v. Schendel,
supra; Tennessee A. & G.R.R.Co.v.Drake(C.C.A.)
276 F. 393. If his act amounted to negligence it
was no more than contributory negligence which
was removed from consideration by the Act. Chicago G. W. R. R. Co. v. Schendel, supra; Auchenbach v. P. & R. R. Co., supra. Moreover, it is the
law that a violation of the Act need not be the sole
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efficient cause in order that an action may lie.
So also the element of proximate cause is eliminated zchere concurrent acts of the employer and
employee contribute to the injury. Spokane &
Island E. R. Co. v. Campbell, 241 U.S. 497, 510,
36 S. Ct. 683, 60 L. Ed. 1125; Pless v. New York
Central R. R. Co., 189 App. Div. 261, 179 N.Y.S.
578, affirmed, 232 N.Y. 523, 134 N.E. 555. In this
situation, where there was nothing to show that
the plaintiff's contributory negligence, if any, was
other than negligence concurrent with that of the
defendant, it follows that an issue of the plaintiff's contributory negligence with its underlying
issue of proximate cause was eliminated from the
case and, in consequence, evidence to prove it was
properly rejected."
In Leet v. Union Pacific R. Co., 60 Cal. App. 2d 814,
142 P. 2d 37, 40, the court recognized that a railroad could
not discharge its duties under the Safety Appliance Act
by passage of rules. In that case plaintiff brought an
action for wrongful death based upon a violation of the
F'ederal Safety Appliance Act requiring all cars used
in interstate commerce to be equipped with efficient hand
brakes. The defendant sought to introduce a rule which
was excluded by the trial court. After referring to Tiller
v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 318 U.S. 54, 63 S.. Ct.
444, 87 L. Ed. 610, 143 A.L.R. 967, the court stated:
"Since the negligence of the defendant in
sending out a car with its brake rigging in a defective condition was concededly established, it
follows that defendant may not be relieved from
the consequences of its neglect by the claim that
plaintiff assumed the risk of such negligence.
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"Rule 26, which was excluded from the evidence, reads as follows: 'When emergency repair
work is to be done under or about the cars in a
train, and a blue signal is not available, the engineman and fireman must be notified and protection must be given those engaged in making the
repairs.'
"In view of the amendment to section 54
and of the Tiller decision rule 26 was immaterial
to the issues and was properly rejected. Chicago,
etc., Co. vs. Schendel, supra. If there was no assumed risk or contributory negligence to be attributed to the brakeman, no amount of rules
adopted by defendant could alter the law if the
company was itself negligent."
In Aly v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 342 Mo.
1116, 119 S.W. 2d 363, plaintiff's suit was founded upon
the Boiler Inspection Act. He sought to mount a moving
engine and when he stepped on the footboard it gave
way, causing him to fall and lose both legs. The engine
was coming toward him at the time he attempted to
mount it. Defendant sought to introduce a rule of the
company forbidding switchmen to board engines coming
toward them. The trial court's refusal to admit the rule
was upheld and the court stated:
"Appellant offered to introduce in evidence
a rule of the company which forbade switchmen
to board engines coming toward them. The trial
court refused to permit this rule to be introduced
in evidence. Appellant has cited the case of Frese
v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 263 U.S. 1, 44 S. Ct.
1, 68 L. Ed. 131. In that case a statute of Illinois
made it the duty of a locomotive engineer to stop
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his train at a rrossing of another railroad and to
positively ascertain that the way was clear before
passing over the crossing. This the engineer failed
to do and lost his life in a collision which followed.
The court held that a violation of the statutory
duty on the part of the engineer was the sole cause
of the injury. "\Vithout deciding whether a violation of a rule of the company is a parity with a
violation of a state statute, there is this distinction: In the Frese Case the plaintiff relied upon
the negligence of the fireman in failing to perform
a duty which the statute imposed upon the engineer. In the case before us plaintiff was relying
upon a defective appliance. So even if plaintiff
violated a rule, that would be only a contributing
cause and not the sole cause. In Spokane & I. E.
R. Co. v. Campbell, 241 U.S. 497, 36 S. Ct. 683,
60 L. Ed. 1125, the plaintiff had violated an order,
and was injured through a defective air hose
which caused a collision. In 241 U. S. 497, loc. cit.
508, 36 S. Ct. 683, 689, 60 L. Ed. 1125, the Court
said in speaking of the violations of the order :
'In its legal effect this was nothing more than
negligence on his part.' The court further said
in the concluding part of the opinion: 'But where,
as in this case, plaintiff's contributory negligence
and defendant's violation of a provision of the
safety appliance act are concurring proximate
causes, it is plain that the employers' liability
act requires the former to be disregarded.' In the
case under consideration the jury was explicitly
instructed that plaintiff could not recover unless
the footboard slipped toward the drawbar and
caused plaintiff to fall. A violation of the rule,
therefore, could at most have been only contributory negligence and not a defense. We must
rule the point against appellant."
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In Jordan v. East St. Louis Connecting Ry. Co., 308
Mo. 31, 271 S.W. 997, plaintiff brought suit based upon
a violation of the Coupler Section of the Safety Appliance Act. Plaintiff kicked the drawbar in order to align
it for coupling and his foot was crushed by the impact
of the couplers. Defendant attempted fo introduce in
evidence a rule of the defendant company prohibiting
employees from kicking drawbars. The court stated:
"The next error assigned is the refusal of the
court to permit defendant to show that a rule
had been promulgated forbidding employees to
kick drawbars, and to show that the plaintiff had
knowledge of the existence of that rule. Upon
that Schendel vs. C. M. & St. P.R.R. Co. (Minn.),
197 N. W. 744, and Kern v. Payne, Dir. Gen., 65
Mont. 325, 211 P. 767, are cited. But it was held
otherwise in Moore v. St. Joseph & G. I. Ry., 268
Mo. 31, 186 S. W. 1035. In that case, one under the
Safety Appliance Act, the question came up upon
a rule forbidding employees 'to go between cars
in motion to uncouple them.' Following reference
to the circumstances under which the question
arose, the court said, loc. cit. 35 (186 S. W. 1037):
"'Further, respondent's violation, if any, of
appellant's rule was at most but evidence of contributory negligence; and in this case, the action
being founded upon violations of the applicable
Safety Appliance Act, contributory negligence
constitutes neither defense nor mitigation. (Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223, U.S. 1. c. 49,
50.) There was no error in this ruling.'
"In the first case cited by defendant, Schendel v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., the question
at issue was one of 'exact obedience from an employee to a foreman's direct command requiring
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instant execution.' It was held that if the employee directly contrary to such command meddled with a defective appliance, his willful disobedience must be regarded as the sole cause of
his injury. But the court distinguished between
a command of that sort and the issuance of general standing orders or rules; the rule on the latter
being that of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Great Northern Ry. v. Otos, 239 U. S.
349, 36 S. Ct. 12-l, 60 L. Ed. 322. This assignment
n1ust be ruled against defendant."
An analogous situation was presented in the case of
Chicago Great Western R. Co. v. Schendel, 267 U.S. 287,
-l-5 S. Ct. 303, 304, 69 L. Ed. 614. In that case plaintiff's
decedent went between two cars to disengage a connecting chain which had been temporarily placed there after
a drawbar had been pulled out. He was injured when
the car ran slowly down the grade. A rule of the company required that employees should advise the engineer
when they were going between or under the cars. Decedent failed to do this although familiar with the rule.
Defendant contended that the defective drawbar was not
the proximate cause of the death and that the violation
of the rule by the deceased constituted negligence subsequent to and independent of the defective safety appliances and was the proximate cause of the injuries.
These contentions of the defendant were held incorrect
and the court stated:
"The things shown to have been done by the
deceased certainly amount to no more than contributory negligence or assumption of the risk,
and both of these are removed from consideration
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old defense of contributory negligence to be a shield
against liability under the name of sole proximate cause.
The court therein stated :
"'If, under the employers' liability act, plaintiff's negligence, contributing with defendant's
negligence to the production of the injury, does
not defeat the cause of action, but only lessens
the damages, and if the cause of action is established by showing that the injury resulted 'in
whole or in part' from defendant's negligence, the
statute would be nullified by calling plaintiff's
act the proximate cause and then defeating him,
when he could not be defeated by calling his act
contributory negligence. For his act was the same
act, by whatever name it be called. It is only when
plaintiff's act is the sole cause-when the defendant's act is no part of the causation-that defendant is free from liability under the act.'"
And also:
"«' * * But having regard to the state of the
proof as to the defect in the coupling mechanism,
its failure to automatically work by impact after
several efforts to bring about that result, all of
which preceded the act of the switchman in going
between the cars, in the view most favorable to
the railroad, the case was one of concurring negligence; that is, was one where the injury complained of was caused both by the failure of the
railway company to comply with the safety appliance act and by the contributing negligence of the
switch1nan in going between the cars. * * *"

In Smiley v. St. Louis & S. F. Co., (Mo) 222 S.W.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'~.~

41

2d -1S1 the court explained why a violation of a rule not
to go between cars could only be contributory negligence.
The plaintiff there Yiolated the rule and the court pointed
out that his presence there was induced and made necessary by the defective coupler. Except for the violation
of the ~-\..ct plaintiff would not have been there and would
not have been injured.
In Scrimo v. Central R. R. of New Jersey, 138 F. 2d
761, the defendant introduced in evidence a rule requiring that cars, etc., be stopped before an attempt is made
to adjust an inoperative coupling device. Plaintiff based
his case on the coupler section of the Safety Appliance
Act. The trial court instructed the jury that violation
of the safety rules was not an issue in the case and the
rules were not to be considered. The defendant excepted
and requested an instruction that if the jury found that
violation of the rule was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury the verdict should be for defendant. The
trial court was affirmed.
See also Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Locher, (Tex) 264
S.W. 595; McCarthy v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 156 F. 2d
877 (cert. den. 329 U.S. 812); Otos v. Great Northern Ry.
Co., 128 Minn. 283, 150 N.W. 922; Potter v. Los Angeles
& 8. L. R. Co., 42 Nev. 370, 177 P. 933.
It will be observed that in every case following modern day principles in which a coupling operation is involved the violation of a rule not to go between the cars
is considered merely contributory negligence and therefore the rule and its violation is not material in the case.
The only coupler case cited by the defendant is that of
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!(ern v. Payne, 65 Mont. 325, 211 P. 767, decided in 1922.
In that case there was no evidence that the couplers were
closed or open and the court determined that in order for
plaintiff to recover there must be indulged in his favor
an inference upon an inference, which the court said was
not permissible. From the quotation contained in defendant's brief it appears that the court concluded that there
was no necessity for the plaintiff to go between the cars.
No such finding as matter of law can be made in the case
at bar.
The Suprmne Court of this State in Garay v. Southern Pac. Co., 223 P. 2d 819, in commenting upon cases
involving the Coupler Act and rules prohibiting an employee from going in between the cars discusses some of
the cases herein cited by plaintiff and refer to such cases
as examples of concurring cause.
The cases cited by the defendant on page 25 of its
brief are cases which generally have been considered
overruled by Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318
U.S. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 87 L. Ed. 610. In any event, those
cases do not concern a violation of the Safety Appliance
Act but in every instance are concerned with collisions
of trains and special orders or violations of statute.
vVhere cases involving Safety Appliance Act have arisen
together with such orders, the courts have held that the
violation of such orders are only contributory negligence.
See Spokane & I. E. R. Co. v. Campbell, 241 U.S. 497, 36
S. Ct. 683, 60 L. Ed. 1125.
The Utah case of Wilson v. Union Pacific R. Co.,
231 P. 2d 715, is not comparable to the case at bar. The

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

43

violation of the rules here involved could be nothing more
than a concurring or contributing cause of plaintiff's
injuries. Plaintiff's presence between the cars was made
necessary by the drawbar being out of alignment and no
mechanism by which he could make the adjustment. His
presence there could not be a sole or independent cause
of his injuries separate and apart from the necessity
which required him to be there.
We submit that the evidence of safety rules and their
violation was immaterial in this Safety Appliance Act
case and that the trial court properly refused and rejected such testimony.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the evidence in this case
supports the verdict and no error was committed in the
giving of instructions and the rejecting of evidence. The
judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK,
ROBERTS & BLACK,
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent,
530 Judge Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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